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ABSTRACT.

Russia has experienced two momentous revolutions during the
twentieth century. The overthrow of the czar in 1917 began the
first. After a brief attempt at democratic rule, Lenin's Bolshevik
Communists seized power in 1918 and established a totalitarian
government, naming the remade Russian empire as the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
The seeds of the second revolution were sown with the elevation in
1985 of the reform minded Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of
the Soviet Communist Party.
His reforms, including perestroika
(restructuring)and
glasnost
(openness,
including
limited
democracy)unleashed strong forces within the Soviet Union. The
revolution that Gorbachev's reforms promoted-or at least
contributed to-reached a crisis stage in 1991.
The old guard communist party leaders, whose positions of power
were being threatened by both perestroika and the demands of many
of the Soviet Union's constituent republics for greater autonomy,
staged a coup against Gorbachev on August 18. The coup collapsed
within days, however, in part because hundreds of thousands of
Soviet citizens took to the streets to rally against it. Boris
Yeltsin, the president of Russia (then a Soviet republic), was the
most visible symbol of democratic defiance of the old guard.
In the aftermath of the crisis, the already weak Soviet state
lapsed into a terminal coma. Central authority dissipated. Real
power shifted rapidly to Yeltsin's office in the Russian White
House and to the other 14 republics, which moved rapidly toward
independence. On December 25, 1991 the Soviet flag was lowered for
last time from atop the Kremlin and the Russian flag was raised in
its stead.
Of the former Soviet republics (FSU's), Russia is by far the
largest, and the most powerful.
Russia has retained all the
Soviets Union's tactical nuclear weapons and the vast majority of
its strategic-range nuclear weapons. These factors make the course
of Russia a matter of great concern for the world.
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the history of the
reform process, the current political and economic situation in
Russia, the process in establishing free market mechanisms and the
realities in opportunity for foreign direct investment in Russia.

A STUDY OF RUSSIA AND THE OPPORTUNITIES IT OFFERS FOREIGN

INVESTORS.
BLEAK STATISTICS, BLEAK POLITICS.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.

INTRODUCTION

In one of his early short stories, "Martyona's Home," Aleksandr I.
Solzhenitsyn wrote a hauntingly prophetic passage about a prisoner
coming home from the labor camps :
"in the summer of 1953 I was corning back from the dusty desert ,
just following my nose - so long as it led me back to European
Russia. Nobody waited for me at any particular place, because I
was a little matter of ten years over due. I just wanted to efface
myself, to loose myself in deepest Russia .... if it was there."'
Solhenitsyn will in a sense be following his nose back to European
Russia, the question is whether there is a Russia that waits or
wants him, and whether his "deepest Russia" is still there.
Solhenitsyn has left no doubt of his ardent longing to devote his
authority and his final years to help his beloved motherland
recover from the ' plague of communism' .
As to whether "deepest Russia" is still there, for most part of the
Russian hinterland remains much as Solhenitsyn left it - muddy,
backward, provincial and poor. But Russia has changed and changed
dramatically, a state in which a tyrannical system ordered
everything and in which every life was caught in compromises and
small lies. But the tyranny also showed human traits - conscience,
courage, weakness, cynicism - in far sharper relief, much as war
exposes strength and cowardice. Every Russian was confronted with
endless choices between integrity and compromises, and there were
none who escaped unscathed. Most people simply struggled to
maintain the modicum of personal integrity in the face of the
state's demand for fealty. It was a harsh and cruel world, but
also one in which whispered truths and smuggled books carried
weight greater than money or status, in which people of conscience
forged powerful bonds and defiance was a mark of greatness.
INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIA: The USSR, spanning eleven time zones and
covering one sixth of the world's land sources is geographically
the largest country in the world. About one quarter of its
territory falls in Europe and the remainder in Asia.

In recognition of national differences, the USSR broke up and was
divided administratively into 14 republics. Russia, which was
officially called Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic,
I

'New York Times May 29, 1994

embraces both the major ethnic Russian concentration and vast but
sparsely populated territories in Siberia, the Arctic and the Far
East. Russia accounts for three quarters of the total area and
half the total population of the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
Independent Russia is the worlds largest country and the fifth most
populous. Russia area totals 17,075 thousand sq. kilometers of
76.2% of the FSU. The total population is 148,041,000 or 51.3% of
the FSU. The population is concentrated at 8.7 persons per sq.
kilometer and is 74% urbanized.
Russia is extremely rich in natural resources. Extensive areas are
ideal for agriculture, especially the famous "black soil" belt.
Forests cover over half of the FSU with an overwhelming share
located in Russia, which accounts for 52% of the total timber
production.
Fuel and natural resources for which the FSU is
extremely rich are mainly concentrated in Russia.
Over 60% of NMP is generated in Russia, with an additional 20%
originating in Byelorussia and the Ukraine. In agriculture Russia
and the Ukraine generate 68% of total value added. Russia has the
highest levels of foreign economic activity amounting to 9% of the
NMP in 1988. Russia's per capita income was also among the highest
at 110% of the FSU average.
PRE-REFORM RUSSIA. After achieving high rates of growth by world
standards in the 1960's the Soviet economy entered a period of
decline in the 1970's.
NMP official growth rates for Russia
averaged 7.8% in the 1960's and the fell to 4.4% in 1971-85 and
only 2.7% in 1986-89. On a per capita basis the last two periods
showed growth of 3.5% and 1.7% respectively. Since the official
statistics were always exaggerated the real decline must have been
even more significant.

Overall the figures can only give a limited understanding of the
real economic situation that eventually forced the reforms. For an
average Soviet citizen the quality of life visibly deteriorated in
the 70's and 80's.
In addition the Soviet Union found itself
economically and technologically unable to compete with the United
States for world dominance. Long driven by the dreams for world
domination , the Soviet Union found themselves falling behind,
especially after Reagan's military buildup and the "star wars"
program. Continuing the competition meant total economic collapse
at home which the totalitarian system could not afford.
THE REFORM PROCESS.
The reform process in Russia cannot be
characterized as a set out or coherent reform program. It began as
an experiment to preserve the Soviet Union by Gorbachev, but soon

deteriorated into a haphazard process of changes in the economy and
the political system of the country conducted by several
consecutive governments.
Soon after assuming his post Gorbachev began his first effort to
improve the situation. The program termed "acceleration", was
designed to revive economic growth by tackling three of the
perceived major defects in the economy, inefficiency, poor quality
and lagging technological development. Although the problems to be
addressed were systematic in nature the strategy remained an effort
to improve the functioning of the existing system, rather than to
change it fundamentally. First, a major re-tooling of the industry
was planned. Second, a strenuous quality improvement program was
implemented. Third, a series of measures were taken with the
intention of stimulating the "human factor" by personal changes,
and work incentives in the industry.
This campaign, however, quickly ran into a series of problems.
This policy of "acceleration" failed at an early stage in 1987. A
more serious push began in 1987, the goal remained the same, which
was to improve the existing system . Two other major changes were
made in 1987. First, firms were allowed to negotiate "contract"
prices for new goods. Although there were strict controls on these
prices the move was designed to encourage production of needed
goods. However, the limits proved to strict to induce any visible
improvements.
Second, private ownership in the form of
cooperatives were allowed.
This had some effect in creating
private sector jobs and some needed consumer goods but the
limitations and obstructions by authorities prevented cooperatives
from playing a significant role until 1990.
Under Gorbachev the reform was limited to delegation of more
authority to state owned enterprises, some liberalization of the
private economic activity and more rights and privileges granted to
local administrations and other republics as well as relaxation of
political control over the population. At this time Gorbachev
tried to preserve some versions of a command socialist economy and
a reworked version of the Soviet Union.
The disintegrating economic situation in Russia and the rise of
nationalist tensions motivated local governments to pursue
independent policies, introduce border customs and patrols, visa
requirements, tariffs and export regulations. The gradual collapse
of the Rouble began in 1989, and the worsening economic situation
were essentially instrumental in motivating the Republics to try
and achieve control over their economies by issuing their own
currencies. As Gorbachev had not believed in the concept of a
market economy, his attempts at reform were counterproductive. By

August 1991, he had reviewed and rejected 13 reform programs,
including the radical "500 day" plan of September 1990. Thus,
having made very little progress with reforms, Gorbachev was forced
out. But, as many say, Gorbachev's greatness lay in his capacity
to destroy everything he tried to save - his party's monopoly on
power, its idealogy and its empire.
REFORMS UNDER YELTSIN AN]) GAIDAR. Trying to give impetus to the
Union Treaty Gorbachev acquiesced to the election of the President
of Russia while himself remaining President of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev in fact was holding an empty crown. Yeltsin was soon
elected as Russia's first President in June of 1991 onreform
platform. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Gorbachevls
departure he got a free hand at reform. He appointed a economist
Gaidar as Prime Minister and the latter pressed on with a radical
but disorganized reform plan.
Their aim was to break down
everything and then re-build. The reform package was radical and
included a radical price liberalization and massive privatization
program. This reform program was based on stringent requirements
of the IMF regarding macro-economic stabilization, price
liberalization, financial and credit-monetary policy. Prices on
monopolies were lifted. With these price rises the government
eliminated most shortages plaguing Russia. By cutting the budget
deficit they avoided hyperinflation. Concurrently the privatization
scheme was initiated.

In 1992 the fall in production began to resemble disintegration .
The overall drop in production reached 18%. In addition , instead
of a deficit less budget promised by the government as late as the
first quarter of 1992 the federal budget deficit rose to nearly 10%
of the GDP. The non-payment in the economy reached 78"sf the GDP.
Taxes became too oppressive for whatever private enterprises there
were. The Congress and the Central Bank began printing money in
droves and extending massive amounts of credits to the industrial
enterprises. This eased the non-payment crises and was popular in
the industrial sector, but fueled a sudden rise in inflation. This
in turn led to the collapse of the Rouble in dollar terms. This
process has been colorfully, if somewhat skeptically, described as
a "not the birth of a market economy, but a gigantic fire sale of
the Soviet Union. Ex-communists, their 'reform-minded', children,
and western carpetbaggers have got in on the hugest asset stripping
operation in history."'
The success of the neo-fascists and former communist parties
including the communist parties and the agrarians (rural

2ruble or rubble? time, October 1994

communists) forced Yeltsin to retort to a more nationalistic stance
and to slow the reform process designed to soften the socioeconomic impact on the population. In the process reformers like
Mr. Gaidar and Mrs. Fedorov quit the government and remained the
leaders of the largest party in the Duma treform Russia's Choice.

-

The composition of the Russian State Duma (lower house of
parliament) after the December 15, 1993 election^.^
Party

%

Votes

Seats

Plus single
constituency

Total seats

Russia's Choice
15.38
Liberal Democrats
22.79
Communist
12.79
Agrarian
7.90
Yablokoo
7.83
Civic Union
1.92
Democrats
5.50
Dignity & Charity
0.70
Russian Unity
6.76
Women of Russia
8.10
Russian Movement for
Democratic Reform
4.06
Parties not listed
Independents

THE NEM CONSTITUTION. The newly ratified Russian constitution is
now the supreme law of the Russian Federation on which all other
laws and regulations will be based. It is necessary to be familiar
with the major premises of this constitution to understand the
possible course of further development of the reform process.

The constitution establishes the principle of three branches of
government, but with a strong presidency, rather like the French
Republic. Under a list of transitional provisions, laws and other
legal acts adapted before the new constitution takes effect, are to
continue in force to the extent that they are not in conflict with
the new constitution.

3what is russian for free press? economist, January 1994.

When Yeltsin unveiled the final draft in a nationwide television
address on November 9,, 1993 he said that Russia needs 'a durable
legal order. '
The constitution finally clearly defines the
separation of power between the president and parliament, it sets
rights, proclaims some free market business principles and
establishes an independent judiciary. This should be of comfort to
Russian democrats and foreign investors alike. However, there is
a possibility for further conflict since the new Federal Assembly
may begin to chafe under a constitutional structure that creates a
strong presidency. The strong relationship between the federal
government and the regions was also changed to create a stronger
center, which is likely to create a source of ongoing tensions with
the local authorities that have grown to like the nearly total lack
of central control during the last two years. The final draft
drops references to local sovereignty, which will anger the
localities and the minorities.
The constitution guarantees a wide array of free market oriented
business principles including the right to own land and other
property, right to free movement of resources, protection from
expropriation and for intellectual property.
PROGRAM FOR 1993-1995.
In August 1993 The Russian
Federation Government set forth a working version of its Reform
Program for 1993-1995. In the document the current situation was
characterized by an unstable balance. Although the rapid decline
of the Russian economy has been halted along with the possibility
of economic growth there is a danger for a relapse into further
decline. Accordingly the government has to aggressively continue
its reform efforts in order to push the economy towards growth in
the nearest future.

REFORM

The main reform efforts of the government are tied into its anti
inflationary measures. To this goal the Russian government has
reached an agreement with the Central Bank to slow the growth of
the money supply. In addition several measures have been adopted
to combat an inflationary rise in the budget deficit. The
government has eliminated some ineffective social programs,
proposed an across the board 15% spending cut and a moratorium on
new spending on the spending side.
On the revenue side the
government will impose a new tax on natural gas production, raise
to 30% a tax on oil production and institute new measures designed
to combat tax evasion.
Another major aspect of reforms is the privatization program. The
main goal is to convert state enterprises into joint-stock
companies which will include not only the manufacturing facilities

but also the research and development and engineering centers.
Despite this relatively gloomy short term forecast many believe
that the long term outlook remains promising. The reform program
has made an irreversible transformation of the Russian economy and
produced a large shift to privatized enterprises, and at the very
least a market oriented economy and a democratically minded
society.
AGRICULTURE. Agriculture remains a very important part of the
Russian economy. While there is tremendous potential in this
sector it remains ineffective and wasteful. Prior to the 1917
revolution Russia was an exporter of grain and other agricultural
produce. Now it imports over 15% of its annual needs consuming most
of the available foreign currency reserves. Until the agricultural
sector begins feeding the Russian population the economic situation
will remain difficult.

Towards the end of 1992 Gaidar informed the public that free pieces
of land would come into effect from 1993. Since then a significant
number of state farms have been privatized. In the summer of 1993
private farmers accounted for 600,000 (about 7%) of the 9.9 million
agricultural work force, covering 3.8% of stock farmland and 2% of
sown land. Private farms and small family plots, which together
constitute about 8% of the agricultural land, and produce as much
as 33% of the nation's agricultural products suffer a severe
infrastructure problems.
The Russian agricultural sector was
geared towards large collective state farms and accordingly there
is no structure to provide farmers with credit, insurance, small
scale equipment or expert advice.
The major law on land privatization was issued in December 1993.
It gives the right to own land and dispose of it freely. The
reform process in the agricultural sector has begun and the
necessary legislative groundwork has been laid. However until the
infrastructure and other problems are resolved farmers will be
reluctant to leave the state farms t stake out on their own and
until they do so in massive numbers the agricultural shortages will
continue.

CHAPTER 11: CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.
ANALYSIS OF 1992-1993. The years 1992 and 1993 were characterized
by a deep crisis of falling GDP, physical output and living
standards. At the same time inflation soared and unemployment
slowly increased.
This fall in output was not caused by a
restrictive domestic fiscal and monetary policy - they have
actually been too lax - but it is mainly the result of the lack of
a clear coordinating mechanism's in the production and distribution
system of the state enterprise. The system of state orders has
been abandoned and enterprises do not find it profitable or because
they cannot afford or obtain the required inputs. This difficulty
will lessen in time as managers get used to market oriented systems
of distribution and the continued progress of the privatization
process. But in the meantime the consequences of reform on the
production levels have been disastrous.

As separate enterprises and even industries are privatized they are
forced to function in a market place that is still dominated by
monopolistic state owned producers. In addition such free market
attributes as business services, accounting and consulting firms,
financial institutional, wholesale organizations, information and
credit rating agencies, and even business press publications are
scarce, inexperienced and inadequate. Also, the previous system of
industrial ministries destroyed the established relationship and
planning agencies were eliminated as well. Newly independent or
privatized enterprises are forced to establish new relationships,
find new suppliers, buyers, marketing channels and partners. The
research and development arms of the ministries have also become
separated from enterprises reducing innovation and making it
difficult to increase productivity or adapt new products. The
other implication of independence or privatization is the fact that
the management teams are now forced to do their own planning, a
totally unfamiliar practice coupled with the erroneous belief that
planning of any kind and free market capitalism do not mesh. In
addition such unfamiliar decisions as price setting, marketing
strategies, labor negotiations, new product development are
required from managers that have never done such things and have
nobody to ask.
The Russian Ministry of Economics puts the decline in GNP as a
percentage of the previous year at 2% in 1990, 9% in 1991, 19% in
1992 and 16% in 1993. In total a 39% in four years.

In 1992 the GDP reached 20 trillion rouble's with its deflator
rising to 1,890% and the national income reached 15.6 trillion
rouble's with a deflator of 2,120%. The physical output consisted
of 81.2% of the 1991 levels. Retail trade declined by 39%,
manufacturing by 18% and agriculture by 8%. Sales of major durable
and soft goods dropped by 35-44%. The service sector also dropped
by nearly 40%.
Output of consumer goods also declined. Its volume amount was 4.7
trillion rouble's, which is a 15% decrease against 1991 in
comparable prices. The prices of food stuff fell more than 18%.
At the same time profits in the corporate sector rose by a factor
of 8 to 8.1 trillion rouble's, mostly due to inflation. Total
corporate debt increased to 12.4 trillion rouble's. Of these 39 %
were subsidized loans to strategic industries.
A deep economic crisis continued in Russia in 1993. The production
continued to fall with GNP falling by 14 - 16 % as compared to
1992, industrial production fell by 17.2%, production of consumer
goods by 11%, capital investment by 6%, and the value of provided
services by 11%. The Federal budget was under a great strain. The
revenues were falling due to the recession while the pressure to
increase spending on social programs to compensate for declining
standards of living as well as subsidies to struggling state
enterprises to avoid layoffs. At the same time there was a dire
need to lessen inflationary pressure.
However with all these dismal figures there were some signs of a
free market at work in that the production of successful products
increased or decreased just barely while the production in
inefficient items such as VCR's fell drastically. At the same time
production of cars, refrigerators, TV sets, carpets, publications,
cheese, sugar, daily products and alcoholic beverages rose fueled
by a rising demand.
WESTERN ASSISTANCE AND ITS IMPACT. There are several different aid
packages under consideration.
The most important one is the
agreement to begin rescheduling of the $15 billion out of the
Russian debt to 18 countries of the Paris club. The deal calls for
only $1.95 billion in payments instead of the scheduled $40 billion
in 1993. The rest will be amortised over the next ten years.
Negotiations with the London club of over 600 commercial bank
creditors to which Russia owes about $45 billion is also under
progress.

Of the new international aid the Tokyo meeting of the 'Group of
seven' outlined major areas of Western financial assistance. It
includes IMF stabilization funds of US $6 billion, IMF stand-by

credit facilities of US $ 4.1 billion to improve balance of
payments, bilateral export credits and guarantees of around US $10
billion to western firms supplying their products to Russia. The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has set up a fund
of US $300 million, to help in the development and promotion of
small and medium size businesses.
The Russian government and reformers are unhappy about Western
assistance levels and their form. Their argument is that despite
continued aggravation of Russia's economic situation, the West only
offers financial assistance in the form of high interest credits
and not as free aid line that was extended when economic reforms
were conducted in Japan and Germany. In addition the processing of
most IMF, IBID and EBRD credits will take a long time and are
burned with economic conditions that are difficult to obtain.
ECONOMIC FORECAST: 1994. The Ministry of Economics predicted a
decline of 5% in GDP, as opposed to a 12% drop in 1993 and 20% in
1992. Also a 6% decline in industrial output and a 5% slump in
agricultural was forecast. Monthly inflation rates were predicted
to be 16% by March and 5-7% by the end of 1993. These predictions
could be significantly off, especially the inflation figures, if
the new cabinet pursues new policies.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also published
a forecast for 1994 from several international organizations
including OECD, UNESC, EC and Plan Econ.
Decline in GDP is
predicted to slow, unemployment to rise or become more open and
annual inflation to slow as well. Plan Econ even goes as far as to
predict a 3.5% annual GNP growth in 1995-1997. IRBD and UNESC
predict a 2-5% growth for the entire FSU in 1998-2012.

CaAPTER IIk TRADE AND CURRENT ACCOUNT STATISTICS.

TRADE AND CXMEWI ACCOUNT STATISTICS.

BACKGROUND: Russian trade is in a state of chaos. The old trading
structures continue to crumble. The centralized import/export
organization disintegrated while the new small scale private
trading enterprises flourished. Before 1986, foreign transactions
were tightly controlled through a central plan and the foreign
currency budget. Approximately 70% of trade has been done on a
clearing basis with socialist countries, Finland and India.

Historically, trade with CMEA (Council For Mutual Economic
Assistance) countries accounted to over 50% of Soviet exports and
imports. FSU was the net exporter of heavy industrial goods and a
net importer of consumer goods. This trade served to subsidize
other CMEA countries every year by price and exchange rate
manipulations.
Since 1986 the government has taken steps to break the central
monopoly on trade and stimulate the growth of exports. By creating
the quasi government Foreign Trade Organization (FTO) in some
sectors and allowing others to export independently. The new
network was clumsy and ineffective with trade suffering a
significant decline. This led to the explosion of small private
trading organizations which made large profits but were unable to
cope with the scope of trade.
All the FSU Republics clearly experienced a trade collapse not only
among themselves but also with other countries in Eastern Europe
and with developed market economies. The total volume of trade
declined due to the overall fall in production, decline in exports
to former socialist countries, as well disruptions in the
infrastructure.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the decline in the
efficiency of the payment system and significantly increased the
transaction costs of trade among its members. There are clear
signs of falling back on less efficient but less risky payment
methods such as barter and foreign currency. With the creation of
the Interstate Bank to act as a multilateral clearing and
settlement organization in the rouble zone the situation has
improved. The collapse of the rouble zone, however can make this
new bank obsolete in the near future.
1993: AVAILABLE STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS. Volume of international
trade fell by 23% in the first half of 1993 to 27 billion USD.

While the main trading partners remain in Europe (68% of total) the
volume has been steadily falling. The trade volume rose only with
Asian countries: China-24%, Turkey-25% and Iran-166%. Trade with
the United States fell by 39% and with Canada by 35%. Total trade
with American countries average only 7% of total trade volume.
Total exports fell by 3% to USD 18.2 billion. Over 60% consisted
of petroleum products, 9% heavy machinery. Total imports fell by
49% to USD 8.8 billion.
Most imports consisted of consumer
products .
The composition of Russian Exports and Imports(in million USD).~
EXPORTS :
PRODUCT

Minerals
Coal
Crude Oil
Petrochemicals
Natural Gas
Timber
Machinery
IMPORTS :
PRODVCT

Jan.

-

Oct. 92

Jan. - Oct. 93

93/92.

150
593
6,726
380
6,116
363
945
Jan. - 8ct.92

Jan.

-

Oct. 33

93/92

"c2t
Citruses
Grai~s
!?heat
c,,~.J~

"-Y

~cdici~b
Clothing
Sbszs
?dchincry

Tqre

is 2 aorprising trade I scrplus of USD 7.4 billisn 2nd this
cd,ds clarific~tisn. P7ith thh deduction of the barter and cledring
operations thb s-rplus fslls tc 1 billion 2nd with~nt the gold
sdles it beczxzs 2 dhficit.
1
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CHAPTER W FISCAL DEVELOPMENT AND MONETARY POLICY.

FISCAL DEVELOPMENT AND MQNETARY POLICY.

INFLATION. Russia has had a high inflation rate since the collapse
of the communist economic system at the end of 1991. The initial
jolt was given by the government liberalization of prices at the
end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992.
Most prices were
decontrolled while the monopolistic nature of many industries
remained the same and many enterprises remained state owned. This
situation led to the monopolistic price setting and resulted in an
even higher jump in prices than could be expected after the
liberalization of prices that were virtually frozen for 70 years.

After an initially tight monetary policy in the first quarter of
1992, the Central Bank of Russia loosened credit for the rest of
the year. The flood gates truly opened in the third quarter of
1992, fueled by huge credits to state enterprises, loans to
government and to other Republics to finance their trade deficits
with Russia.
The central Bank acted in cooperation with the
Supreme Soviet in an effort to prevent further decline in output.
The Ministry of Finance was bitterly opposed fearing a rise in
inflation. "We increased the volume of credits in order to prevent
a further fall in output and investment.
But by late 1992
recession had slightly slowed down, and we began to take
restrictive measures," say's Mr.IZhandruev5. This view contradicted
the position of the then Minister of Finance Mr.Fedorov and many
international economists who thought that the monetary policy was
already too lax and that the fall in output was caused by the
breakdown of industry relationships.
At any rate, the following chart demonstrates the growth of the
money supply in 1992 and the first part of 1993. The cause of
inflation becomes obvious.
Average Monthly Rate of Money Supply Growth ( % ) =

Money Supply(M3)total
including:
Cash Money

12.7

15.4

29.1

17.1

14.3

22.5

27.8

21.8

'cruel to be kind, economist, december 1993.
"merging market indicators, economist june 1993

Non-Cash Funds

12.3

13.7

29.5

15.8

15.1

The Central Bank kept its refinancing rate at 80% between May 1992
and 1993 while the consumer prices rose by a factor of 24%.
Alongside cheap direct bank credits to the enterprises, massive
explicit subsidies were channeled from the state to the enterprise
sector.
In addition Central bank lending rates to Commercial
Banks, and in turn their lending rates to the public remained
negative until December 1993. This led to hyper inflation with
figures reaching nearly 35% per month in 1992. The efforts by the
Ministry of Finance to stem this tide were only partially
successful when the Central Bank decreased emissions in 1992. The
agreement was short lived. As the 1993 summer harvest season
approached, the Central Bank initiated a new wave of agricultural
credits, with the total credit expansion by the bank equalling 40%
of the annual GDP. The inflation pattern has roughly followed
these ebbs and flows of monetary growth with a lag of about four
months.
The consumer price index rose by 344% in 1993, fueled by a twofold
increase in fuels, transportation tariffs, rents and liberalization
of coal prices.
Rise in Monthly Consumer Price Index.'
Percent to previous month.
MONTH

1992

1993

139

121

January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Yearly Average

The total inflation for 1992 caused a price increase by a factor of
26 and in 1993 it was 1,300%.

7emerging financial markets. economist January 1994.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN DEBT SITUATION: Total external debt has increased
drastically since the start of the reforms in 1985. During the
first phase in 1985-87 the debt rose from 29 billion USD to 39
billion. During the second phase of 1987-90 it rose to 52 billion.
At the same time foreign currency reserves fell from 13 billion USD
to only 5, while debt services rose from 8 billion to 13 billion
USD.

As of the end of 1992 the total Russian external debt stood at 74.6
billion with 2.8 billion in overdue interest. During the first
quarter of 1993 the debt decreased to 72.5 billion but the overdue
amount increased to 4.7 billion. Debt on medium term credits
totalled to $32.7 billion, down from $36.3 billion on January 1.
The debt on commercial credits was $7.2 billion as of April 1, 1993
up from $6.6 billion at the beginning of the year. The debt to
foreign governments was about $35 billion while to commercial bank
creditors, between $ 16-25 billion.
Loan defaults by foreign governments on debt to Russia amount to
USD 5.1 billion. A significant part of these are considered uncollectible.
Over $7 billion in Russian loan payments were
rescheduled. Total foreign debt increased by $11.4 billion. Total
capital inflow was positive however capital in flight tendencies
have escalated. Foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank rose
to $4.1 billion mostly due to IMF credit^.^
CAPITAL FLIGHT: While foreign credits amounted to 12.7 billion the
positive balance of capital inflows amounted to only 7.1 billion.
The apparent difference was kept by exporters in offshore accounts
in violation of existing legislation. The total economic damage
was calculated by the Central Bank to be over USD 6 billion. This
allowed Russian commercial banks to significantly expand their
offshore deposits.
Legal capital flight alone, expressed in
correspondent balances in offshore banks, amounted to $4.1 billion
ip 1992. Another contributing factor is the large grey market for
unregistered and illegal exports. Many companies evade government
quotas and export licensing requirements by exporting their
products through intermediaries and former Soviet Republics and
keeping most of the proceeds abroad. Many companies deliberately
lower the official price of their exports while channelling the
remainder into offshore accounts.

Total capital flight amounts to up to $17 billion. This creates an
impression on the part of Western creditors that Russia should be
able to increase its debt payment to more than the current 2-3

spolicy research division, world bank, 1994.

billion a year. This could be done only if the capital flight
could be stopped. In order to do that far more stringent currency
and custom contrbl as well as a significant improvement in the tax
collection system. Weak custom control on the CIS borders due to
budgetary constraints, massive corruption and the mafia influence
would hamper these efforts for a significant period of time.

CHAPTER V: SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS.
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Under Russian statistical definitions total
LABOR SITUATION.
capable labor force, or all those by age and health able to work,
consisted of 86 million. Total number of employed was 72 million.
Just over 1 million people were registered with government
unemployment agencies. The difference of 13 million between labor
capable and employed/unemployed is explained by theoretically
employable people choosing not to work.
Of the 1 million
registered 700,000 were classified as unemployed and 65.7% received
unemployment benefits. In addition over 3 million workers were
underemployed of which 1.9 million were furloughed with partial
loss of salary.
It is estimated that 11% of workers in the
industry are now employed part time and that the total latent
unemployment is estimated at 15 million. Furthermore, over 83,400
enterprises employing over 26.2 million workers or 36% of the work
force have announced plans to cut back on production and to
restructure. Under such conditions it is estimated that open
unemployment will reach 2-3 million in 1993.
The percentage of female participation in the economy is very high
by western standards. In addition, Russian women work longer hours
since part time work is virtually non-existent with 99% employed
full time. In December 1993 Yeltsin raised the minimum wage from
7,740 to 14,620 rouble's a month. Stipends to students and other
transfer payments were amended accordingly. The living standards
that were never high in the FSU have fallen drastically. The
average Russian has cut consumption to 40% of the 1991 level.
Every third citizens on or under the poverty line of 10,000
rouble's per month, this is 42% of the country's families. The
average family spends about 65% of its income on foodstuff and the
lowest one third spends as much as 80% of their income on a diet
dominated by bread.
LIVING STANDARDS. The average monthly wage as of September 1993 are
as follows:

..............................................................

RUSSIAN WAGES: SEPTEMBER 1993
INDUSTRY

Culture and Art
Science
Agriculture

AVERAGE WAGE

Education
Health
Public administration
Industry
Construction
Transportation
Finance

60
67
80
77
110
120
160

Overall average

60*

*All wages are in thousand of rouble's.

Living standards that were never reasonably high in the former
Soviet Union have drastically fallen. Now the average Russian has
cut his consumption to 40% of the 1991 level. Every third citizen
is or under the poverty line of 10,000 rouble's per month, this
includes 42% of the countries families. The average family budget
includes up to 65% spent on foodstuff while the lowest one third
spend as much as 80% of their income on a diet dominated by bread.
In 1992 consumers spent 63.9% of their income on goods and
services, 10.1% on statutory payments and various contributions,
and 4.5% on savings. Cash money on hand grew by 1.4 trillion
rouble's, or 21.4% of the cash income, which corresponds to the
1991 level.
The average monthly income per capita in Russia as of November 1993
was 37,908 rouble's which constituted about $25 at the official
exchange rate of the period. For the employed it was sightly
higher 42,799 while for pensioners it was 26,705.'
Survey of opinions of Russian's as to what their economic future
looks like . l o
Question 1: Economic outlook for Russia over the next five years.
Conditions will improve a great deal
Conditions will improve somewhat
No significant change will occur
Conditions will deteriorate somewhat
Conditions will deteriorate a great deal

'central european business information service, January 1994.
"'reforming russia's economy, economist december 1993.

23.2%
58.9%
11.4%
3.6%
2.9%

Question 2: Economic outlook for Russia over the next 12 months.
Conditions will improve a great deal
Conditions will improve somewhat
No significant change will occur
Conditions will deteriorate somewhat
Conditions will deteriorate a great deal

5.7%
43.8%
31.6%
13.8%
5.1%

Question 3: Most important step towards improvement in the economy.
Maintaining a stable rouble exchange rate
Adopting a simpler system of taxes
Improving the local infrastructure
Developing stronger foreign trade ties
Educating the work population about free market
Reducing government subsides to industries
Increasing government subsidies to industry

26.1%
26.5%
7.9%
11.3%
12.1%
6.7%
9.3%

Question 4: How would you assess the political situation in Russia
today?
Development of democracy
Preservation of the old order under new names
Establishment of a dictatorship
Loss of order, increasing anarchy
Hard to say

14%
17%
7%
429
20%

Profile of all respondents:
Owners
Self-employed
Consultants
Agents
Managers
Investors
Joint venture participants
The attitude of the people are extremely important for the success
of the reform process. The feelings towards the reform process
remains ambiguous. While the people seem to approve of reforms in
principal most are disenchanted with the realities. Asked whether
they consider the reform process to go to slow, just right or too
fast, 64% opted for the first option and only 5% and 4% for the
latter two. However the overall approval of the market system is
still significant: 54% of the population feels that the effort to

convert to a market economy is good for the country's future while
only 25% feel the process to be harmful. On the other hand 39%
that the chosen methods of reform are wrong while 33% agree with
the governments choices.
Russian business executives are moderately optimistic about their
economic future. Most feel that their conditions will improve,
however most also feel that the improvement will come later rather
than in the near future. Support for radical economic measures is
also weak while such perennial free market concerns as tax systems
and education shows strength.
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FmANCIAL MARKETS IN RUSSIA.
STOCK EXCHANGES AND BOND MMUQZTS: The first year of major activity
and development in the Russian security market was 1991. The rapid
growth was encouraged by the emergence of the legislative basis for
security trading.
Laws on 'Enterprises and Entrepreneurial
Activity', 'Joint Stock Companies', and 'Issue and Circulation of
Securities and on Stock Exchange'. Several types of securities are
currently being traded on the Russian equity markets. They include
privatization vouchers, stocks of newly privatized and fully
private companies, four types of government securities and foreign
currencies. The major stock exchanges are Moscow Central, Moscow
International, Siberian and St. Petersburg Stock Exchanges. Five
major groups of institutions involved in securities trading include
commercial banks, private industrial enterprises, commodity and
stock exchange, investment companies and mutual investment funds,
trading and industrial companies.
Stock remains the major
securities traded. Commercial Bank stocks have been the most
active offering high dividends of 150 - 200%. Bank shares take up
as much as 50% of all shares traded.
COMMODITY EXCHANGE: Commodity Exchanges have played an important
role in Russia's modern history. They became the first really
large institution to pave the way for market development. They
introduced new techniques of trading and price formation that
afterwards were implemented by the market.
Finally Commodity
Exchanges offered an unprecedented example of spontaneous
renaissance and growth of private enterprises.

Commodity Exchanges of 1988 - 1992 have played a major role in the
developing of a free market. They were significantly flawed in the
price formation and 'after-market' activities but they showed the
way for free market price formation and exchange of goods replacing
the formerly centralized distribution system. Several steps were
taken by the government towards improving the operation of
Commodity Exchanges in 1993.
The government considers the
Commodity exchanges to be instrumental in a free market system and
aims to increase their activity and even channel government
purchases through the exchange in future.
COMMERCIAL BANKS: As of April, 1993 there were 5,627 Commercial
Banks registered with the National Tax Service. Before the reforms
the banking system was monopolized by 4 government structures. The
Central Bank and 4 specialized banks for financing long term
investment in industry (Promstroibank), agriculture (Agroprombank),

communal and social services (Shilstosbank), and a savings bank,
were the privileged institutions permitted to operate in the
country.
Decentralization and de-monopolization policies introduced early in
1990 brought the 'two level' structure. While the Central Bank
still remains at the top of the system newly born commercial banks
have begun to mushroom during the last three years. Nearly 6000
new establishments (headquarters and branches) are functioning at
the retail level. Almost a third of the new banks have their
origin in the former three major specialized banks who preferred to
grant their ex-affiliates autonomy.
There is a significant
international participation in the Russian banking system. Russian
bank are now allowed to participate in ownership of foreign
financial institutions and banks. This requires special permission
from the Central Bank.
There are still serious problems in the Russian banking sector.
The capability of the banks to screen the credit worthiness of
prospective borrowers and to monitor their activities is limited,
the extensive use of directed credit programs limits the role of
the bank to passive intermediaries, inside lending is a wide spread
phenomenon and the negative interest rates continue to prevail.
Many banks are severely under-capitalized, have a weak deposit base
and they have a weak loan portfolio with a sizeable portion of bad
and unrecoverable loans.
PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS. Nearly three years ago, Russia embarked on
the crucial part of its effort to become a market economy: selling
the property of the state that once owned everything and thus
founding a nation of property owners with a stake in the success in
economic reforms.
When the end of price controls wiped out
savings, the Government chose to conjure up a middle class by
giving away most of state property, issuing 144 million vouchers
free to every Russian to turn into shares.

Now with most businesses and two-thirds of the Russian work force
formally under private control, the voucher program has effectively
ended and real capitalism, using real money finally begins. This
second stage will be the stiffest test of whether the free market
will really catch on in this vast distorted economy. Private
companies are being thrown into a perilous environment where credit
is hard to get, debt among companies is are high, management is
weak, crime is rampant, taxes are punitive and consumers are poorer
than they were three years ago.
In July 1994, with some exceptions, the government, began selling
its remaining enterprises for cash, not vouchers. The companies,

-

many of which are starved for capital, are to get 51% of the
purchase price. Private enterprises will also be able to sell
land, and private investors should now be able to exercise more
control over management.l1

FUTURE OF PRIVATIZATION: A privatization program for 1995 is being
prepared for submission to the new Federal Assembly by the State
Property Committee. Under the proposed program, about 100 large
enterprises with capital of more than 1 billion rouble's will be
targeted for privatization. For the most part these enterprises
will be in the oil and gas sector, automobiles and machine tool
building. The draft plan would also make it easy to privatize
enterprises in the defense industry and land. In addition the
privatization of export agencies owned by the Foreign Economic
Relations Ministry is anticipated with the government maintaining
controlling interest in the main commodity export agency.
PROBLEMS: Russia's stock market has emerged with astonishing speed.

The first stage of mass privatization, which began in December 1992
and ended in June 1994, put more than 14,000 large and medium-sized
enterprises and their workers into private hands and created 40m
shareholders. Many of these shares are now worthless, either
because their issuer is bankrupt in all but name, or because no one
will make prices in them. However, there is now a liquid market in
the shares of the 50 largest companies. This market is not for the
faint hearted; prices move with stomach churning speed. For eg.
the shares in Perm Motors, a maker of aircraft engines, fell by
43%(in dollar terms); shares in Kamaz, a maker of trucks, rose by
29%. Shareholders can be treated roughly.
If Russia's stock market and privatization efforts are to gain
credibility, it needs to establish a few basic rules, enforced by
a credible regulator.
These include establishing shareholder
rights, clarifying who owns the land on which privatized
enterprises are sitting, and establishing a central depository and
custodian for shares to make the secondary market more liquid.
Since it has a residual stake of around 30% in nearly all of the
privatized companies, and stage two of privatization involves
selling these stakes to finance government spending, it is in the
interest of the government to get these things correct.
What is surprising is that Yeltsin has entrusted the next stage of
the privatization efforts to Valdimir Polevanov, whose only
conceivable qualification is that he is loyal to Yeltsin. His
views on privatization until. now have been alarming,"Like day has

"lurching into the capitalist era ... new york times, july 1994.

night
and
life has
death, privatization
should
have
nationalization." He feels that the reckless denationalization of
the aluminum, energy and defense industries has damaged Russia's
national Security. He feels that foreigners should not be allowed
to buy stakes in these sectors as it is bad for Russia's security.12
The US is spending $13 million annually to help Russia in its
privatization plans.

''the problems of polevanov, economist January 1995.
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There is precious little information and hands on advice for
western companies operating in Russia. New rules are constantly
being adapted, reworked, withdrawn and changed. Some laws come out
including deadlines long passed. In some areas there are no laws
and regulations governing economic activity at all. In addition,
with the absence of common law, one cannot look to courts to
provide guidance.
Contracts are unenforceable and government
regulators are often corrupt. Accordingly it is necessary to
understand as much as possible about the rule of the game before
investing or even making a decision to invest.
The following are some of the rules that an investor in Russia
should
Rule 1: If you want to be making money in Russia ten years from
now, you have to get to work now. Russia is no place for fast
deals.
Negotiations are protracted, putting together a deal
involves many steps; the language barrier is enormous, it takes a
long time to build up trust, trust is vital. Market research is
very important as the information and statistics are less than
satisfactory.
Financial statements are prepared without any
recognized or uniform accounting statements and are unaudited.
Rule 2 :Good partners, not legal recourse are a foreign investors
best protection in Russia. Business is based on friendship and
personal understanding.
Rule 3 :Western companies that do best are the ones in which the
top management get personally involved and the country reams are
stable. The buck still stops at the top in Russia. Lower ranking
business officials have little independent authority.
Rule 4 :Begin small locally. In contrast with experiences of doing
business during the time of the centralized Soviet system, the
projects that are making money in Russia today are not the big
deals negotiated at the top of the government, but the smaller ones
that have begun at the lower level,
Rule 5 :Do not insist on full formal control. This is the most
difficult rule for Western companies, because it is the hardest to
justify to banks and boards. Full formal control is the most
sensitive issue in the business world of Russia. Full western
ownership, without a Russian partner is the most controversial of
all.

"russia 2010 and what it means for the world, by daniel yergin and thane gustafson

GENERAL OPERATIONAL DIFFICULTIES. Important operational problems
often cited by foreign investors, include the hiring of Soviet
workers, quality control, finance from foreign sources, political
risk insurance, custom duties and tariffs and a relationship with
the local government. There is no clear legal frame work governing
relations between the joint venture and the government at local or
federal levels. The most serious operational problem stems from
the difficulty in developing a reliable means of securing supplies.
Management is another problem as there is a lack of trained
managers and key employees, there is a lack of understanding of
marketing principles, of ones competition and how to cut down
costs.

Predictably, a host of other problems associated with poor
infrastructure such as domestic and international communications,
office facilities, banking and related financial services, housing
and other amenities are also a major barrier to Western investors.
Additionally the lack of enforceability of contracts and the lack
of organized dispute settlement are problems as, old Soviet courts
are ill prepared to deal with new economic disputes and laws are
unclear and sometimes contradictory.
COUNTRY-RISK RATING.

l4

Iraq
Russia
Nigeria
Venezuela
Brazil
Argentina
Philippines
Turkey
Mexico
Poland
Greece
India
South Africa
China
Israel
Indonesia
Thailand
Malaysia

14emerging-market indicators, economist, december 1994.

Chile
Czech Republic
South Korea
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Singapore

---

---- - 30%

-------- 30%

------ 25%
----- 20%

----- 20%
--lo%.

TAX SYSTEM. The tax rates in Russia remain high in comparison with
US policies:
Employer payroll
Employee payroll
Income (top marginal)
Income(lowest marginal)
VAT ( standard)
Corporate (standard)
Capital gains

39%
1%
30%
12%
20%
32%
30%

The estimate of the total effective tax rate given the above
combination of taxes ranges between 55% and 63% depending on the
model used.
The effective tax rate on capital. income is an
astonishing 97.8%. These effective rates are about 15-20% higher
than in other Central European countries but is on par with other
FSU republics.
Indirect taxes have remained a key source of revenue, especially
due to the introduction of VAT. New profit taxes are to play a
more important role in the future due to their importance to a
market economy. However due to inflation and weak government
control leading to tax evasion and late payments are significantly
eroding the government revenue base.
The VAT is assessed to
foreign goods at the point of entry. It covers foreign currency
sales and is to be paid in foreign currency. Food, medicine and
children's clothing are untaxed.
Profit tax is collected in
advance payment biweekly from enterprises and quarterly from joint
ventures.
Tax on excess wage increases is assessed and paid
quarterly. Wage income tax is withheld from the payroll and the
withholding is final; no annual adjustment is made. For the self
employed advance payments are due quarterly and the annual form is
filled by January 15.
The major problem with the tax situation in Russia, however,
remains the fact that no clear collection and disputer resolution
procedures are established and many items remain unclassified and
undefined .
BANRRUPTCY LAW. The Russian parliament approved a bankruptcy law

on 12 November 1992. Although it was expected that enforcement
would begin in March 1993, the Russian government acknowledged in
February 1993 that it would not attempt to enforce the bankruptcy
laws due to the perceived lack of resources.
Securities Regulations.
Current securities regulations are
underdeveloped and unsophisticated but and effort is on the way by
German and British teams to draw plans for new rules. Current
rules establish a mechanism for conducting both public and private
placement of securities.
Initial offerings by a joint stock
company must: be registered with the Ministry of Finance, unless
offering exceeds one billion rouble's, in which case Federal
approval is needed. Placement of banking company stock must also
be registered with the Central Bank. Private placement, require a
signed application accompanied by notarized corporate document and
a management decisions statements including the terms of issuance,
the use of the proceeds and the list of investors.
Public
placement must include all the information required of a private
placement plus a prospectus, all of which must be available to
potential investors and the mass media.
MAFIA INFLUENCE. During the years of reform a new and dangerous
phenomenon emerged in Russia. After 70 years of total police
control the dismantled KGB and ousted Communist party officials
joined the growing organized crime divisions. By some estimates
these organizations now control as much as 60% of all commercial
structures in Russia. They are especially prevalent in the most
profitable and easy to control sectors such as retail, whole sale
and international trade. Now they are starting to move into more
profitable, lucrative and bigger industries such as banking, real
estate and mineral exports.

The explosion of criminality in Russia is due to the enormous money
being to be made in the Russian market. Most of the countries
assets are up for grabs. Moreover, Russia's economic potential,
both as an exporter and as a market, is so large that the first
entrepreneurs to commercialize a given sector can earn vast
profits.

CHAPTER VIIk FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TN RUSSIA.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA
IMPORTANCE: The presence of a positive FDI flow is extremely

important for the progress of reforms. To the extent that more FDI
improves the supply side flexibility of the economic policies and
generally stimulates growth, it contributes to the success of the
reform programs, reduces the probability of their reversal and may
thus also add to political stability.
By exposing public
administrators to market-based thinking, early foreign investors
may contribute to smoother bureaucratic procedures and less
discretion in the future. By increasing the competitiveness of
markets, they may speed up the process of relative price
realignment.
By their presence, they may induce a private
provision for a financial and distribution infrastructure, thus
enhancing information and reducing transaction costs. In contrast,
the absence of a positive FDI can be a factor in stymieing reform
efforts by prolonging the transition and thus increasing the
probability of policy reversal.
TOTAL E'DI IN RUSSIA: Few, if any countries offer as potentially
attractive opportunities for large scale foreign direct investment
as Russia. It possesses a vast internal market, a critical need
for an efficient and expanded consumer goods industry. It has
enormous natural resources whose efficient exploitation would yield
large benefits both to Russia and to foreign investors. It has
large untapped business opportunities resulting from the conversion
of the defense industries, a woefully underdeveloped service sector
- including the basic distribution system and business-related
services, where foreign know-how would be extremely valuable and
the general need to import foreign technology, managerial skills
and experience in operating in a market environment.
The total foreign direct investment in Russia has been minimal to
date in terms of foreign capital actually invested. The main
factors hampering investment are inadequacies in political
stability, economic and in the regulatory environment.
Among the investors, US corporations proved by far the most active
with more than triple the number of deals than the next most active
country, Germany. South Korea was a surprising third, with other
European countries and Japan closely following.
In total
investment value, however Cyprus emerged as a surprising leader.
Considering the fact, however, that several billion US dollars in
Russian flight capital is hidden in Cyprus, the surprise
evaporates. In reality Russian banks and exporters are channeling

the off-shore capital back into Russia through fronting Cyprus
companies.
Among the true foreign investors the US retains
primacy, South Korea with its Siberian investments is second and
Germany, France and Italy closely follow. In joint ventures alone
the US dominates closely followed by Germany.
Foreign Direct Investment in Russia is being distributed into
several major areas of the economy. Investment into the oil and
gas industry, spurred by the Framework Agreement on Oil and Gas
between the World Bank and the Exim Bank of the US leads the way,
several other industries are proving attractive for foreign
investors. Electronics and Telecom sector has actually attracted
higher number of deals than oil and gas, albeit lower in total
value.
The automotive, aerospace, hotels, mining and banking
industries have also attracted investment interest. The trend in
joint ventures alone is somewhat different. As much as 80% of
these are dedicated to the service sector.

CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION.

CONCLUSION.

When writing about the prospects of the states of the former Soviet
Union, observers confront the same problem that baffled them in
1918: not only is it hard to guess where the region is headed, it
is also unclear how far the disintegration from a unified empire to
splintered sub-parts will go. So severe and complex is the crisis
that the only certain fact is the existence of innumerable
uncertainties. This makes it inordinately difficult to estimate
the region's ability to prepare for the twenty-first century, since
its leadership is primarily concerned with surviving the present
chaos and its people are overwhelmed by the daily need to make ends
meet. In such circumstances little energy is left to consider
global trends, let alone adjust to newer challenges.
Four years of radical economic reform have failed. Shock therapy
has made inflation worse, not better. A few people have grown rich
but most face poverty. Crisis threatens: at best widespread social
unrest, at worst a decent into anarchy. The problem at present is
too little reform, not too much. To understand this one has to go
back to Gorbachev and the beginnings of post communist Russia.
Gorbachev's greatness lay in his capacity to destroy everything he
tried to save- his party's monopoly on power, its idealogy and its
empire. As for economic reforms, "virtually every mistake that
could be made was made" by, Gorbachev.15 By the end 1991, Russia's
share of the Soviet Union's budget was equal to 31% of Russia's
GDP. Industrial output-the collapse of which is now blamed on
reformers-fell 19% in 1991.
Gorbachev's last two Prime Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov and Valentin
Pavlov, spent all the Soviet Union's foreign-currency reserves
trying to conceal the disaster. Its own money gone, the government
appropriated $10 billion deposited by Russian and Foreign companies
in the state-owned foreign exchange banks. At the end of 1991, the
Soviet Union collapsed. Boris Yeltsin was elected president of
Russia, he appointed a team of reformers lead by Gaidar to sort out
the mess. Foreign reserves were very low, the shops were empty and
there appeared real danger of widespread hunger in big cities.
According to Grigory Yavlinsky, an economist who is one of Gaidar's
main political rival, the Gaidar team's great mistake was to
liberalize prices before breaking up the monopolies which had

15anders aslund in the economist, december 1993.

dominated the Soviet economy.l6
In an ideal world, Yavlinsky ' s
prescription would have been correct. But there was nothing ideal
about Rilssia in the Summer of 1992. The priority was to get goods
into the shops and the only way to do that was by liberalizing
prices. In January Gaidar lifted price controls from 90% of traded
goods. By the next day prices had risen by an average of 250%.
That was the bad news, the good news was that the shops quickly
began filling their shelves.
Western aid has been pouring into Russia in an attempt to prop up
Yeltsin and democracy. The West should resist the urge to pour in
aid indiscriminately, especially in the light of Russia's election
and the rebirth of militancy. Government -to-Government transfers
will not help Russia, like transfers to third world countries has
not helped them develop.
Aid to a certain extent has
institutionalized corruption, entrenched atavistic institutions,
and side lined the private sector to the black market. The Western
nations in an attempt to help , should encourage the Russians to
introduce reforms to stimulate entrepreneurship, enter into free
trade agreements with Russia and the struggling ex-Soviet
republics, promote private investment by eliminating -incentives to
it in their own countries, help finance mass privatization of the
russian economy, forgive or restructure the foreign debt incurred
by the FSU and finance the dismantling of nuclear weapons.
Russia on the other hand should be advised to establish a regime of
low taxation and minimal regulation, uphold and expand private
property rights under a rule of law, and establish investment laws
and trade policies that would attract foreign capital and stimulate
rapid growth of the private sector. Another way in which the West
can help the FSU is by removing all trade barriers. Nations that
have received most Western aid since World War I1 report that
lowering barriers to trade is far more helpful to their development
than are large amounts of Government-to Government aid transfers.
Once and for all, the West should end its out-dated reliance on
large scale government-to-Government aid. The world can ill afford
the consequences of turning Russia into a international welfare
dependency. Massive aid to Russia only would entrench unproductive
institutions and prolong the crisis. A better solution is to base
development on the proven success of free markets and free
enterprise.
The last thing the west should do for Russia, is to get rid of
Boris Yeltsin. There was a time when the world could hope for

"cruel to be kind, economist. december 1993

great things from Yeltsin.
As Russia's first democratically
elected president he set out to establish , by the people's consent
, a stable, free market democracy. Given the problems afflicting
what is, in effect, the worlds sixth continent, that was going to
be an awesome task. Yet over the last year Yeltsin mistakes have
become so glaring that, even before the bloody battle in Grozny,
Yeltsin the tsar of democracy had already shrunk in historical
size. Still there was hope that, for all his mistakes, Yeltsin
would keep the momentum of reform going and hold off the challenges
from communist and nationalist forces. Now even that hope looks
ready for burial. Once the reforming strongman, Yeltsin is now the
wrong man to lead a reforming Russia.
What to do? We have lost our way.
He is leading us astray.
-Alexander Pushkin.

From afar, the Demon cries out,

APPENDIX

THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL HI OH LIGHTS.^'
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES
-Russia is "a democratic federative, rule-of-law state with a
republican form of government."
-Principles of separation of powers among the executive,
legislative and judicial branches, with a strong presidency.
-Fundamental principles of human rights are guaranteed.
FEDERAL SYSTEM
-The delineation of responsibility and power between the federal
government and local authorities is defined.
-Local self government is recognized and guaranteed and
jurisdiction is defined.
RULE OF LAW
-The constitution and federal laws are paramount.
-Republics may have their own constitution and legislation.
localities may have their own charters and legislation.

Other

BUSINESS PRINCIPLES
-The Russian Federation is a unified economic area.
-Freedom of economic activity, support for competition, free
movement of goods, services, and capital are guaranteed.
-The rights of private owners is protected. Property may not be
expropriated except by a court order.
-Land and natural resources can be privately owned."Owners freely
possess, use and dispose of land and other natural resources."
-All forms of property-private, state, municipal and other formsenjoy equal recognition and protection.
-Economic activity aimed at monopolization or unscrupulous
competition is not permitted.
-Newly introduced taxes cannot be retroactive.
-Right to inherit property is guaranteed.
-Intellectual property is protected by law.
-A minimum wage is guaranteed.
-Citizens have the right to freely dispose of their labor and
choose the nature of their work.
-The right to work in a safe and clean condition is protected.
-The right to strike is "recognized."
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PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
-Elected to a four-year term; serves no more than two consecutive
terms.
-Can issue decrees and directives whose implementation is
mandatory.
-Appoints the prime minister with confirmation by the State Duma
(lower house) .
-Appoints deputy prime minister and other federal ministers.
-Can dismiss the prime minister and his ministers and dissolve the
State Duma in limited, specific instances.
-Is the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
-If unable to perform his duties is temporarily replaced by the
prime minister.
-Impeachment articles are clearly defined.
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY
-Federal Assembly has two chambers, the Federation Council
consisting of two representatives from each constituent part of the
Russian federation, and the State Duma, which consists of 450
deputies elected by combination of party lists and individual
districts.
-State Duma deputies hold four-year terms (cannot hold other
positions except to serve in the government) and the Federation
Council terms are to be determined later.
ADOPTING LAWS
-Legislation can be proposed by the president, Federation Council,
Duma, the government, or regional legislatures. For matters under
their jurisdiction legislation may be introduced by the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and Superior Court of
Arbitration. The laws are first introduced into the State Duma
then sent to the federation Council.
There is a conference
committee to reconcile differences but the Duma can override the
council's rejection by a 2/3 majority.
-Adopted laws must be signed by the president. 2/3 vote in both
houses are required for over riding the veto.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMCNDMENTS
-Elaborate process is required.
JUDICIAL BRANCH
-Judges are independent and subordinate only to the constitution
and to federal law.
-Constitution Court consists of 19 judges and hears constitutional
issues and resolves disputes over areas of jurisdiction. Supreme
Court is the highest court for civil, criminal, administrative and
other cases. Superior Court of Arbitration is the highest court

for the resolution of economic disputes.
-Justices for these high courts are nominated by the president and
confirmed by the Federation Council.
Judges in lower federal
courts are appointed by the president.
CENTRAL BANK
-President nominates the chairman of the Central Bank, which
requires confirmation by the Duma.
The Duma can remove the
chairman or the President can recommend such removal.
-Basic function of the Central Bank is to protect and guarantee the
stability of the rouble.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND -OMS

-Extensive Human and Civil rights are guaranteed.
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